The Global Significance of the Fifth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of CPC

The 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China has just concluded its fifth plenary session in Beijing, where the party reaffirmed its commitment to persevering with full and rigorous Party self-governance.

The session reappraised the performance of the party, examining its achievements and setting out the fundamental responsibilities, guiding principles and plans needed to sustain that effort going forward.

One of the reasons why the Communist Party of China (CPC) holds this session is to ensure that it keeps reinvigorated, alert to the needs of the Chinese people, and does not get lulled by its own success, despite it being the largest ruling party in the entire world with more than 101 million members.

The CPC has made it a solemn responsibility to stay vigilant and never lose sight of potential risks that usually come with long-term governance. It is easy for a political party that enjoys great support of the citizens, with a long history of holding power, to become complacent, to tolerate inadequate competence, and even to become estranged from the people and get eaten up by the vice of corruption. The CPC is alive to these risks, that’s why it chooses to confront them head-on.

Since 2014, when the party first adopted the term “full and rigorous Party self-governance”, sceptics and cynics from different quarters around the world criticised and scoffed at it as likely to be a passing gust. However, more than a decade later, time has proven that the CPC’s campaign was serious, and it has neither stopped nor softened.

There is latent evidence in the numbers of what the party has done to sustain that effort. In 2026, just between January and September, the party conducted disciplinary inspection and supervision in various state organs across the country, culminating in the opening of 800,000 cases and the disciplining of 680,000 people. These are figures far above the totals of the efforts undertaken in 2014 when this exercise began.

To uncover more violations, the Party has broadened oversight and strengthened enforcement with the aid of big data and technology. It is now apparent that President Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption crusade is an ongoing and sustained effort, aimed at preventing new abuses of public resources.

Nevertheless, it has been the CPC’s historical pattern to combat corruption, and evidence goes back to 1926, when the party was just five years old. It was already paying attention to self-governance, and its Central Committee was already issuing its first document aimed at combating corruption.

It has become customary in recent decades for almost every Central Committee of the Party to convene a dedicated plenary session on Party building. Whereas the emphasis has shifted with changing circumstances, the issue has remained a priority on the core political agenda of the Party.

During this year’s plenary session, members stressed the abundance of favourable conditions which are now in place for advancing full and rigorous Party self-governance, while they also recognised the many new circumstances and new issues they faced in this endeavour.

They were cognisant of the profound changes in global, national, and Party conditions which have made the Party’s tasks of uniting and leading the Chinese people in safeguarding China’s sovereignty, security, and development interests, of uniting and leading them in promoting reform and development and maintaining social harmony and stability, and of maintaining its advanced nature and integrity even more arduous.

The delegates recognised that this poses formidable challenges to the Party’s governance and leadership capacity, the quality of its membership, and its resistance against corruption and moral decline under the new circumstances.

They also observed that the “four tests” and “four dangers” confronting the CPC are still protracted, complicated, and serious.

As China works on the new ambitious goal of national modernisation 2026-2030, the Plenary Session emphasised the importance of persevering with full and rigorous Party self-governance, and the capacity of CPC members to lead the country to modernisation.

The Party recognises that there is a lot more that needs attention. There is a need to cultivate higher-calibre officials, to build a well-knit organisational system characterised by cross-level alignment and effective implementation, and to take firm and coordinated action against corruption, and ultimately to refine the Party and state oversight systems.

The conduct of the CPC deserves global attention, if not admiration. Where else in the world do you find a ruling party with such a long-term, fundamental strategy for ensuring full and rigorous internal self-assessment and audit? Which political parties in the world enforce such strict management of their officials and members’ discipline?

Additionally, the world also has something to benefit from the discipline and stability of the CPC. As China’s governing organisation, the CPC is directly and indirectly a major contributor to and stabiliser of global economic growth, because it directs how China’s market functions and institutes stable policy expectations and a sound security environment not only to advance Chinese modernisation, but to benefit all the countries of the world that trade with China.

The writer is a Senior research fellow at the Development Watch Centre.

Xi-Trump Summits Point to Managed US-China Competition

President Xi’s latest visit to Washington came less than five months after his US counterpart President Trump was in Beijing on a state visit in May this year. The Chinese President’s trip to Washington besides coming too soon, was also very symbolic of a new trend in China-Us relations. While the September bilateral meeting comes amid unresolved questions around; trade, critical minerals, and AI, it points to a model of diplomacy where the Washington-Beijing rivalry is managed through sustained leader-level negotiations other than the traditional American brute force model. As these reciprocal high-level visits abound, they signal a managed form of US-China competition built on mutual interests and strategic cooperation.

The unfolding dynamic of US-China relations speaks to the changing mechanics of the relationship between the world’s largest economies whose consequences often ripple throughout the entire global economy. Reciprocal meetings point to a dynamic where the two sides cannot afford an unmanaged relationship even amidst strategic competition. In a global set up where tensions between the two result in severe risks to global supply chains, constructive relations them are crucial in stabilizing not only supply chains, but also the global economy.

This trend in US-China relations is increasingly shaped by efforts to balance competition and cooperation. For instance, between May and September, trade and technology restrictions have deepened, while strategic competition over semiconductors, AI and critical minerals also continued. During the same time, the situation in the Middle East and Taiwan have also stayed a fundamental sticking point. Nevertheless, economic interdependence also remains significant enough to make economic decoupling untenable. The current dynamic thus, signals a shift towards what Beijing has termed as a constructive relationship. It is a demonstration that even amid intense strategic rivalry, the world’s two most powerful economies can still rely on leader level diplomacy to stabilize relations and the global economic system.

This notwithstanding, we must not judge the reciprocal visits on their ability to alter the strategic competition landscape. Rather, we should view them from the point of view that both nations have a shared appreciation of an entrenched interdependence between them and a collective role in global prosperity. The high-level interactions are the opposite to the “cold war-style” separation; with China showing openness to advancing friendship between its own and the American people. Even when current global power dynamics make competition inevitable, there is still hope in both leaders’ enduring incentive for direct engagement through summit diplomacy. This is highly critical in managing competing interests where both sides acknowledge the serious implications their policies have on each other, but also on the global economy.

The talks in Washington as would be expected were dominated by discussions on Trade, critical minerals, Technology and Security —particularly Taiwan. Meanwhile, the extension of the trade truce that was about to expire in November further proved the usefulness of such engagements in avoiding escalation. The ability for leaders to hold negotiation outside of formal bureaucratic negotiating processes played a supporting role in securing this trade-truce extension. However, one of the outstanding question that remain is whether US-China tensions can be effectively resolved without addressing the underlying dispute, the attempt to contain China’s raise as a global power. Albeit the Washington meeting not rewriting the concessions reached in Beijing, it reached the key milestone -—of  extending the truce which is crucial both for the two parties, but also for global economic stability.

The biggest question that remains unanswered here is whether or not the two powers can reach an agreement. All the same, the trade truce extension in the least allows both sides to stay engaged in negotiations. Moreover, to countries in Africa, Asia and the wider global south, US-China tensions result in both economic and supply chain pressure blighting economic prospects. Beyond constrained supply chains, this friction shrink the diplomatic space, development finance, trade and investment, and technology access. Even when mutual understanding between great powers often results in smaller nations clustering around either power, this rarely negates the opportunities associated with the ability to pursue relations with both.

Therefore, the current trend of reciprocal leader-level engagement, exemplified by the Washington meeting, are efforts to manage US-China competition and a step towards building a framework for managed competition. Summit diplomacy will thus be key in minimizing the risk of escalation and the fallout from it that is disruptive to the global economy. Where US-China tensions, to African mean limited room for diplomatic maneuver and erode development autonomy, the sustained leader-level interaction between both powers reduces economic pressures and the risk of subordinating long term planning to external geopolitical constraints.

The writer is a research fellow at the Sino-Uganda Research Centre.

 

 

 

What Dong Jun’s Xiangshan Speech Signals for Global Security Governance

In the morning hours of 16th September, the Minister of National Defence of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Admiral Dong Jun took to the stage at the Beijing International Convention Center to deliver an address that officially opened this year’s Xiangshan Forum. Being the 13th edition of conference’s international security and defence caucus, there was a lot that stood out in testament to the progress that has been made thereunder over the years. The fact that over 100 nations were represented for instance. For our purposes here though, we will focus our lenses on the message that Mr. Dong’s speech sent instead.

The military chief set a good tone for his audience not least because while he did not shy away from big issues, he tackled them with a cool-headed temperament. In no ambiguous terms thus, he warned against reckless usage of emerging technologies like artificial intelligence (AI) in military endeavours. Minister Dong’s demeanour on this point mirrored that of his ministry’s response a few days prior when the United States of America’s Air Force Secretary Troy Meink publicly affirmed that USA had deployed weaponry in space. There showcasing that Beijing’s preferred approach when it comes to these matters is restraint.

The rationale for this stems from an appreciation of the horrendous pitfalls that humanity has fallen into in the past whenever it has jettisoned prudence in matters of security. In Admiral Dong’s words, “we must bear the lessons of history in mind and remain highly vigilant against all latent manifestations of hegemony, militarism and historical revisionism.” In the face of this reality, the senior military officer explained that the government under which he served was ready to cooperate with other nations under the global security initiative (GSI). Notably, a key attribute of GSI is to take seriously the legitimate security concerns of all nations.

But this opener was not just about painting a picture of what could be, it was also about putting in place mechanisms that will ensure that the espoused good intentions do not go to waste. So when the Defence Minister called upon major powers to shoulder the responsibility of guaranteeing that majority of the world continues to be a conducive place to live and that the parts of it which are presently enduring conflicts overcome the same, he did not stop at that. He further made it known that China would participate in these efforts by among others, sharing its military experience and capacities with the countries that need them.

This would be in continuation with Beijing’s impressive record in say UN peacekeeping― PRC is already the leading contributor of troops among the permanent member states of the Security Council. As for innovation, Hon. Dong Jun stressed that the time was ripe for the global community to engage in extensive dialoguing with the explicit aim of formulating legal frameworks to govern the intersection of security with developments in fields such as AI. Again, we have been here before. All that the defence chief was emphasizing is that we ought to have learnt our lessons by now. Imperfect as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was, Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson (unlike Donald Trump today) understood that when dealing with technologies of a certain magnitude, the broader interests of humanity ought to take precedent.

Beyond the speech itself, as evidenced by the persons that took to the podium later that day as well as throughout the event, it is evident that its objectives took root fairly early on. The United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations, Jean-Pierre François Renaud Lacroix thus, expressed his enthusiasm over the fact that the Xiangshan Forum advanced multilateralism, a value that he noted the UN shares too. Relatedly, the Secretary General of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation spoke about equal and indivisible security as a notion that the membership of the body he heads were keen on safeguarding.

One of the most remarkable speakers as far as expounding on the concepts that PRC’s Defence chief introduced goes though was Singapore’s Minister of Defence, Chan Chun Sing. Explaining that because technological iterations were happening in “days, not years”, Hon. Chan raised fears of insecurity spiralling if state actors fail to prepare ahead of time. From his standpoint, this necessitated that politicians differentiate between competition on the one hand, and enmity on the other. One model that the minister suggested could help avoiding a conflation of the two categories is being mindful of when a given player’s security aspirations turn into threats or aggravating factors to others. He then went on to demonstrate that this careful balance was not impossible to attain using the illustration of Sino-Singapore relations.

In the end, Dong Jun’s delivery stayed true to the day’s theme; “Build Consensus on Stability, Advance Security Governance Together.” As the Xiangshan Forum attendees go out in the world to forge solutions for the complicated questions that their positions inevitably bring them into contact with, the remarks will have given them something to ponder about.

Joshua Kingdom is a lawyer and a Research Fellow at the Development Watch Centre

 

Africa’s Stake in the Global Governance Initiative

Observing that the world was strained by war and clogged with the drudgery of institutional paralysis in multilateral institutions over the recent years, President Xi Jinping of China proposed the Global Governance Initiative (GGI), promising to bring equality and sanity to global leadership. His proposition carried five elements: sovereign equality, the international rule of law, genuine multilateralism, a people-centred approach, and the transformation of declarations into results. Xi’s proposition was made at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Plus meeting on 1 September 2025. At the first anniversary of this milestone, it is worthwhile for Africa to interrogate how much stake we hold in this initiative, and what we can do to participate more meaningfully in setting the agenda of global governance, instead of being backbencher members.

Over 80 years since the end of the Second World War and the establishment of the United Nations, the Security Council still reflects and represents the power arrangements of 1945, with Africa, a continent of 1.4 billion people, still marginalised and holding no permanent seat at the council. Voting powers under the Bretton Woods institutions continue to be entrenched in the same ways they were shaped almost a century ago. They still favour the strong economies over smaller ones. Meanwhile, with all this happening, America’s response is to retreat from multiple multilateral commitments to which it was once champion. For instance, on January 20, 2025, President Donald Trump signed an Executive Order on his first day in office, and officially started the mandatory one-year notice period to exit the World Health Organisation (WHO), which was officially completed on January 22, 2026. Likewise, Trump also withdrew the United States from the Paris Agreements twice, first in November 2020, and again in January 2026, Joe Biden having rejoined the accords in 2021. This vacuum of global leadership is where China has moved, together with the Global South, to fill. No matter what reservations and/or criticisms are levelled against China’s motives and approach, one important truth is that there is a real vacuum, and it is China that has, for a while, filled it economically, and now is beginning to fill it politically.

The past year has seen the GGI make some institutional traction beyond rhetoric. In a white paper published in June 2026, titled More Just and Equitable Global Governance: China’s Principles, Proposals and Actions by the State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, Beijing explicitly called for greater representation of the Global South in global governance bodies. It also called for the fair and just application of international rules, which have customarily become enforceable at the discretion of Western powers and their allies.

Some adjacent initiatives have also been folded into the GGI framework by Beijing, including data governance, climate cooperation, and the continued expansion of South-South partnerships that predate the GGI itself. In itself, the GGI is not a replacement or usurpation of the UN system, but rather a reform proposition that seeks to complement the successes and benefits of the UN.

Africa, as one of the largest constituents of the Global South, has a significant stake in the GGI. We should not see our place in the GGI architecture as a gift we are invited to take. We have to claim our stake in it, define it, and defend it. We must be seen to proactively set the GGI’s agenda. If our role in this initiative is not decisive, then our benefit from it will be as negligible as our say is optional.

Since 2005, the African Union (AU) has had the Ezulwini Consensus under which it continues to demand two permanent seats with veto power and five non-permanent seats for the continent at the UN Security Council. This has been our common position in demanding the Security Council’s reform.

The sovereign equality entrenched in the GGI’s language is now our entry point into inviting China, our partner, to actively support and sponsor Africa’s position on reforming the Security Council. China has real leverage in the multilateral forums where Africa demands reform, including the Security Council itself. Therefore, it should move beyond verbal endorsements and work practically to support Africa to realise this justice. That said, it is important to note that despite being a member of UNSC, it is also actively invested in sponsoring the reformation of the Council, which shows that Beijing is not selfish but sincerely wants other countries to enjoy favours it currently enjoys at in SC.

In the General Assembly, Africa also has significant numbers it can leverage. As a continental bloc, we can set conditions at platforms like the G20, instead of merely getting accustomed to receiving proposals from there. Bargaining alongside Beijing on GGI-aligned initiatives is good, but that alone might perpetuate the asymmetric bargaining power we are trying to graduate from. We need a coordinated AU position that is similar to how we approached the Continental Free Trade Area. Negotiating for the GGI’s implementation as a bloc will earn us more success than we could secure as individual African States.

In a nutshell, Africa must name its own priorities under the GGI’s five propositions. Our stake in the forum will only grow in proportion to what we stand for and bring to the table, beyond raw materials and voting numbers. In China, we must cultivate a new partner, not a new patron. The GGI diagnosed the global leadership problem of our time accurately. But now it is up to us to take the initiative to step up and set the agenda, or shrink into another polite synonym of the old hierarchy we have worked long and hard to reform.

The writer is a senior research fellow at the Development Watch Centre.

What China’s Zero-Tariff Policy Really Means for Africa

Since May 1st, 2026, 53 African countries have had zero-tariff access to the Chinese market. This is one of the most momentous developments in the realm of global trade. No other major world economy had ever unilaterally and comprehensively granted African economies such preferential treatment before.
The zero-tariff arrangement is a culmination of two decades of gradual expansion of China’s economic relations in Africa since 2005, when it first established duty-free treatment for a small basket of products to some of Africa’s Least Developed Countries (LDCs).
Over the years, China expanded and widened the preferential space within which African countries could do business with it through discussions at various FOCAC summits (Forum on China-Africa Cooperation). By December 2024, at least 33 African Least Developed Countries had benefited from a myriad tariff lines from China. The zero-tariff expansion that commenced in May 2026 was therefore initiated for the remaining 20 non-LDC economies, including Kenya, Nigeria, Egypt and South Africa. This preferential arrangement is designed to run until April 2028. The terms of this arrangement are also expected to be anchored permanently in the forthcoming China-Africa Economic Partnership for Shared Development agreement. Therefore, this is China’s latest step on the ladder of supportive economic relations with Africa, which we have been building together since the early 2000s.
It is crucial that we put into perspective the context under which this development has emerged. The United States, which had for long been the leading development partner of several African countries, with such initiatives such as USAID and AGOA (the African Growth and Opportunity Act) acting in the governance and economic spaces of our countries, has evolved a considerably hardened posture towards us. Thanks to Trump’s undisguised contempt for Africa, America’s relationship with us often dwindles when he is in office. Sometimes, this is not a really bad thing.
AGOA was paused in September 2025, bringing America’s cornerstone policy of trade preference for Africa to a halt, which is struggling to pick up despite later being renewed. This experience reminded our countries of the fragility and brittle nature of our relations with Washington, which seems to sway with the shifting moods of the Trump regime.
It has even been worsened by the coercive trade tariff diplomacy which has come to punctuate Trump’s second term in office. There’s therefore a deliberate contrast in posture to be deduced from China’s moves at this time, although as already posited, it has been building fairer and better trade arrangements with Africa since the 2000s.
The global economic and trade arena is now a contest and contrast between Beijing’s predictability and Washington’s volatility. The more America embraces protectionist tendencies, the more China implements openness. Beijing has not even demanded or required reciprocal tariff cuts from African governments. It has been unconditional, except, of course, for diplomatic recognition. This is both sheer generosity and strategy. I see no problem with either, since such a strategy is mutually beneficial. It should be Washington to worry now, since its soft power pre-eminence on the continent is being won over by Beijing.
If we evaluate this new development on the spectrum of China’s fifty-year sweep of cooperation with Africa, this policy marks not an incremental adjustment but an inflexion point. It is a paradigmatic shift from the decades of steady engagements in infrastructure financing, mining and industrial park development. What was less developed in this partnership was trade access to the Chinese market. This has now been handled. African countries now stand a chance to earn foreign exchange from China by importing processed and value-added goods, textiles, etc.
Nevertheless, we must face the new challenges now, which will become more apparent when the celebration confetti is swept away. We must build the efficiency to meet the rules of origin requirements. We have to build capacity to meet phytosanitary standards. We have to meet certification costs. We have to meet logistics bottlenecks. We need to meet all these challenges if we are to benefit. We don’t just have to simply celebrate open doors but also prepare to organise behind them how to make. We must build industrial capacity to convert tariff-free access into genuine export diversification.
The writer is a senior research fellow at the Development Watch Centre.

The Remarkable Story of the Global Governance Initiative’s First Year

Today, 1st September marks one year since President Xi Jinping first unveiled the Global Governance Initiative (GGI) to the world. Speaking to attendees of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Plus meeting last year, the Chinese statesman’s remarks (and subsequently the proposals advanced therein) at the time can only be looked back upon as becoming more prescient today.

President Xi’s address advanced five tenets that have now been concretized by the GGI concept paper as the initiative’s “core principles” the first of the batch being a commitment to sovereign equality. The idea is that when relating, nations ought to respect one each other “regardless of size, strength or wealth.” This means among others, that no country should poke its nose into the domestic affairs of another and that when participating in activities that involve multiple states, the parties involved should do so as equals.

Unfortunately, since the launching of GGI, there has been numerous instances on the world stage by those who see themselves as most powerful and therefore, having the right to play arbiters of who does what including when the issues at hand rise outside their countries’ borders. Perhaps the most extreme example here was the ousting of Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro by the current United States administration. In an operation dubbed “Absolute Resolve” (AR), the United States army laid siege on the presidential palace in Caracas in the morning hours of 3rd January, 2026 the result of which was the abduction of both the then President of Venezuela and his wife Cilia Flores. Unsurprisingly, the ousting drew wide condemnation from political leaders in the region including their excellences; Gabriel Boric (Chile), Claudia Sheinbaum (Mexico), and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (Brazil). The United Nations Human Rights Office did not mince words either explaining that AR undermined the very foundations of global security.

Most disturbingly, AR is far from being a stand-alone act. From President Trump’s rhetoric but also from military interventions he has orchestrated elsewhere, the emerging patterns are there for everyone to see. While the ongoing war with Iran has hit a stalemate to much of his frustration thus, one worries what the US head of state could have done if he had had his way. To remind ourselves, it is the same world leader who in April this year took to his Truth Social account writing that “A whole civilisation will die tonight, never to be brought back again.” Most people agree that this is but a genocidal statement (a crime that is outlawed by the Rome Statute). For GGI, it is here that core principle 2 comes in as it is all about adherence to the rule of law. In asserting that international law has to be “upheld unwaveringly”, the Global Governance Initiative’s concept paper makes no exception for any individual or actor on this matter.

GGI has also been crafted to avoid a common pitfall for many otherwise good causes i.e. implementation. This is possible because of core principle five: “commitment to real results.” On this front, the initiative seeks to bolster international organizations particularly the United Nations through championing reforms that these institutions urgently need in order to match the challenges of our age. For instance, GGI highlights the persisting neglect of the interests of the global south by the aforementioned platforms. Other concerns raised by the initiative are misdiagnosis of the problems at hand with much of the focus being placed on “symptoms” rather than the “root causes” as well as the sluggishness with which pressing needs are handled. Indeed, the concept paper’s background indicates that “the U.N. 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development is seriously lagging behind.”

That said, unlike UN members who have only dwelt on the system’s downsides with some going as far as withdrawing their membership from a host of its agencies, Beijing’s approach under GGI has been that of carrot and stick. In that sense, China’s attitude can be seen as criticism done not for its sake but because GGI’s architects view the United Nations as integral to the realization of the initiative’s goals and that consequently, its betterment directly translates into success for them too. To this end, core principle three reads in part as follows; “The U.N. is the core platform for practicing multilateralism and advancing global governance, whose role must be enhanced, not weakened.” This stance of realism is driven in part by a deep appreciation of history. Crucial in this case, is an understanding that the UN was established in the aftermath of a bitter war of global magnitude. The Global Governance Initiative hence carries within it an exercise of precaution. Eighty years later, GGI insists that diplomacy remains the wisest path to take in the pursuit of humanity’s common interests.

Beautiful as it is in theory, GGI ultimately has to be judged by what it has accomplished on ground. For most endeavours of this stature, it often requires anywhere between two and five years before a proper picture of the direction that they are taking begins to take shape. In testament of the Global Governance Initiative’s triumph however, we do not have to wait this time around. The full details of the milestones that GGI has arrived at in her first twelve months can be found in the State Council Information Office’s June 2026 white paper titled “More Just and Equitable Global Governance: China’s Principles, Proposals and Actions.” To give the reader an idea of what I mean though, two of these achievements are; Beijing being the biggest contributor of troops to UN peace keeping missions amongst the permanent members of the Security Council and the country’s establishment of the China-UN Global South-South Development Facility in September last year alongside the UN.

In the year that followed the unveiling of GGI, the initiative has become more relevant (not less). As the international community continues to debate about the course that things should take moving forward, GGI has presented diplomats the world over with a model to learn from. Importantly, as this piece has argued, the Global Governance Initiative’s way of doing things does not just look elegant. It has already garnered significant momentum an attribute that has in turn enabled it to bring forth meaningful results in its short life span.

Joshua Kingdom is a lawyer and a Research Fellow at the Development Watch Centre

 

Beyond the debt trap myth, 13 years of China’s BRI and East Africa’s Integration

At the peek of the U.S.-Israeli attacks on Iran and the subsequent closure of the Strait of Hormuz, most cargo that was heading to the gulf from China ended up at Lamu Port in Kenya. Lamu has also made headlines as Aliko Dangote’s preference for an oil refinery. Well Lamu port is part of the 21st Century Maritime Silk road which makes up sea routes linking China to South East Asia, Africa and beyond of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Lamu is part of the of the 46 ports Beijing developed over the last 13 year within the BRI.

Lamu Port in East Africa is a tip of the iceberg when it comes to the issue of landlocked countries, it’s at the end of the LAPSSET corridor that is Lamu-South Sudan-Ethiopia. For countries that have no access to the sea the BRI has been a life line. It’s more than an ambitious grand strategy that was proposed by President Xi Jinping in 2013, since it has materialized into a physical, economic and financial reality across the East African region just like it has in most of the Global south.

Here in landlocked Uganda the BRI is beyond theory and it has shaped infrastructure projects for the last 13 years, with projects like the 49.5km Kampala-Entebbe Expressway that cut travel time from about 2 hours to below 30 minutes. The BRI has reshaped the energy sector in Uganda with the 600MW Karuma Hydropower Plant and the 183MW Isimba Hydropower Plant, it’s also the BRI that saw Entebbe Airport upgraded and hence being used as a propaganda tool by western media to prop up the debt trap diplomacy myth by China, the whole study was debunked by Professor Deborah Bräutigam in her paper ‘A critical look at Chinese debt-trap diplomacy: The rise of a meme’ that established China had no intention of debt trapping Africa with the terms in the various infrastructure agreements.

In East Africa Ethiopia is one of the biggest beneficiaries of the BRI, with the Ethiopia-Djibouti $ 4bn rail line that connects Addis to the Red Sea, the Railway is also Africa’s first fully electrified cross border line that was constructed By China Engineering Corporation and China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation. Apart from Lamu Port, Kenya also has the Mombasa-Nairobi Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) that was constructed by China Road and Bridge Corporation and it directly contributed 1.5% to the countries GDP and reduced logistical cost by 40%, despite the huge debt that China Exim bank provided.

As the BRI gets into its teenage years, it’s clearly past the debt trap diplomacy peddled by western media with their petty Afro pessimism, the reality is that China’s BRI has brought about profound economic transformation, with evident fiscal realities with countries across Africa being the ultimate determinants of the true triumphs. It’s also clear that BRI deals as the first quarter of 2026 reached new records of about $ 126 bn, $ 22bn of it going into industrialisation on the African continent.

Through the 13 years Beijing has hosted a number of BRI forum summits and each has laid the foundation for certain periods in the execution phases, in 2013 President Xi proposed the BRI and it’s conception started taking shape, between 2015 to 2018, the BRI went through institutionalization and rapid expansion, 2018 to 2020 was about consolidation and quality control, then during the peek of Covid19 emphasis was on health/digital Silk road and pandemic adaptation until 2022, during the 10 year mark, it was about small and beautiful green and digital recalibration and the world waits for the next phase. The Chinese Communist Party put the BRI into its charter in 2017 and it is very central to China’s 2026-2030 five year plan.

As Africa paves it’s path to a prosperous future the needed infrastructure cannot exist in a vacuum and that is why BRI is genuinely credited for fostering intra-African trade because the physical rail and roads are unfolding under the BRI that basically synergize with the African continental Free Trade Area (AFCFTA), that means Africa can not be passive recipients, the continent should be pro active in negotiations and also utilize the opportunities that are falling in place. African countries should make sure the BRI aligns with their own national development plans to industrialize.

At 13 years the BRI is not an abstract geopolitical experiment, it’s been tested, it’s the concrete, steel and electric grid upon which regions like East African community’s future will base on to grow and expand. Countries like DRC in East Africa should stop treating the BRI as great power competition toying with who gets to develop the Lobito corridor and instead leverage China’s will as started in the ‘Global Development’ Initiative with strategic clarity that can turn material infrastructure into durable economic sovereignty, otherwise G7’s Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGI) has no truck record apart from a write up on the state department website.

Africa should approach the BRI as a tool for industrialisation, connectivity and economic sovereignty. The next phase should therefore be about turning Chinese built infrastructure into Africa led economic transformation.

The writer is a research fellow at the Sino-Uganda Research Centre.

China’s Smart Manufacturing Revolution: Setting New Standards for Industrial Competition

A thriving civilization for millennia, China experienced a period of unprecedented upheaval and humiliation following a period of highly disruptive foreign interference starting in the 1830’s. However, hunger for self-redemption, a return to its glory, and a political rebirth, inspiration was found in the success of the Bolshevik revolution. Indeed, this was more than just inspiration. It became the spark that lit the engine of the revolutionary vehicle that is leading the nation’s charge to its glory. This journey has enabled China to transition from a nation seeking inspiration, into one offering it, and providing global leadership in many areas including smart manufacturing.

More than setting new standards for industrial competitiveness, in leading the charge into smart manufacturing, China now offers inspiration and hope to both industrializing and industrialized economies of the world.

Smart manufacturing combines computer-integrated manufacturing, advanced robotics, Internet of Things (IoT) technologies, Artificial Intelligence (AI) and real-time data analytics into industrial processes. With physical factory systems connected to an Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT), smart manufacturing aims to provides cushioning from an increasingly volatile global supply chains landscape. Unlike in traditional manufacturing, where vulnerability often increased with the time-lag between shock-impact cycles -causing delayed readjustments, the incorporation of real-time data analytics here seeks to optimize industrial manufacturing processes and increase supply chain resilience. Integrating Artificial Intelligence (AI) also offers such services as, predictive maintenance, computer vision backed quality inspection, production scheduling based on demand forecasting; all features reinforcing supply chain resilience.

When the twentieth central committee of the Communist part of China, during its fourth plenary session last year emphasized high-quality development and Science and technology self-reliance, it was merely building on previous initiatives, specifically the State Council’s Made in China (MIC2025) initiative of 2015. The key objective of the made in China initiative was to oversee a national transition from being a manufacture of low cost-labor intensive commodities into a hi-tech driven powerhouse built on wide-ranging high-value indigenous innovations. Whereas the pursuit of technology self-reliance might be interpreted by some as a response to growing hostility in some nodes in the global tech supply chains, it is as much a part of a long term strategy that started at least a decade ago.

Results of the preceding MIC2025 are nothing short of inspiring, going by a success scoring of up to 86-percent on the set benchmarks according to independent analysts including the Rodium group, Mercator institute for China studies &c. This achievement didn’t just lead to a radical shift in China’s global standing, but the global economic landscape as well as global economic perspectives regarding what is and isn’t possible on the path to modernization. For instance, China managed to leapfrog traditional automotive manufacturing to become the global leader in electric vehicle and EV battery supply chains. This is in addition to attaining highly optimized levels of production for solar panels, wind turbines while successfully deploying millions of industrial robots. Today China boasts of approximately 35000 basic smart factories, upwards of 8000 advanced facilities not to mention hundreds of pioneering hubs focusing on heavy sectors such as aerospace, High-Tech shipping et cetera -putting it ahead of all modern manufacturing economies.

From 2015’s MIC 2025 to the fifteenth five-year plan’s new quality productive forces framework. This new framework only embeds and builds on the previous initiative. Whereas the notion of new quality productive sources quickly attracts skepticism regarding risks to jobs universally, China is boldly moving to assure the world that this belief can only be partially true. To China, the risk is more a function of factory automation than it is to smart manufacturing. Other than replacing workers entirely, many smart factories merely change the nature of work. With functions such as AI assisted decision making, human machine collaboration, and remote monitoring, humans will still remain a key aspect of the smart factory. Meanwhile, whereas technical upskilling has been key supporting the smooth transition into smart manufacturing, recent curriculum reviews introducing new majors and eliminating others are also directed at expanding national capacity to produce graduates with the right skillset to power the country’s smart manufacturing ambitions.

Aside from intentional investment towards building self-reliance on the talent side, China has also made strong consistent commitments to investing in research and development. Both positions signal ambitions rooted in reality – a reality where fear regarding new technologies is apparent and economic hostility and protectionist policies are rife. As a result, some elements of the revolution for instance science and technology self-reliance are both strategy and outcome. As the world’s largest developing nation, it has witnessed that increasing geopolitical importance attracts increased hostility but beyond that, it is also developing for the future, a proven toolkit for building resilience in such a geopolitical and geo-economic environment.

There are also the implications of smart manufacturing especially on developing economies. Under frameworks like the Forum on China Africa Cooperation FoCAC, Africa has also witnessed increased integration into the global economy fueled by the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Through the BRI, projects that buttressed intra-continental connectivity have been undertaken in road, rail airport and sea port upgrades across the continent not to mention expanding continental electric grid by more than 30 Gigawatts. Running alongside these developments has been building domestic industrial chains, supporting and setting up industrial parks and specialized industrial zones. Thus, viewing this phenomenon as just a negative corollary of China’s Smart manufacturing revolution is to me a “glass is half empty” perspective. To Africa this is a welcome boost to the continent’s industrialization effort let alone arrangements in the extractive sector that have incorporated localized refining giving the continent its largest ever share in the mineral value chain.

More than being about robots replacing workers in factories, China is demonstrating that smart manufacturing is about transforming factories into intelligent eco-systems where data, AI, big data and skilled people shape productivity. It is also building a blueprint for making this transition while striking a substantial balance between benefits (offshoring industrial processes) and preempting shocks to the labor markets through   upskilling and review of curricula to align university education with the new wave of industrialization. Importantly, diligent execution of its smart manufacturing strategy is testament that industrial competitiveness in the new era will be controlled by economies that master this transition with diligence and precision.

The writer is a research fellow at the Sino-Uganda Research Centre. 

China’s Vision for an AI World Order

Seventy years since the composition of the term Artificial Intelligence (AI), the world has made significant progress in making that technology a reality, turning what seemed science fiction into “science friction” with ethics and safety. A new wave of systemic change driven by AI is washing across all the continental shores of Earth. At the recent July 17 World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organisation (WAICO) summit in Shanghai, China stepped up to lead the world in devising joint strategies for building a just and equitable system for global AI governance.

China recognises the utility of promoting AI for the positive and beneficial application of its power for humanity. Various technological leaps have reshaped the course of human history. The Industrial Revolution was heralded by the invention of the steam engine. Modern society was transformed greatly by the widespread extension of electricity. The entire world was closely connected and linked by the birth of the internet. With the AI revolution, we are witnessing major changes never before comprehended. Industrial transformation is beginning to increase at scales off the charts. We are entering a period of unprecedented global innovation supported by AI.

Therefore, we now face critical governance responsibilities that are carried by the immense opportunities and challenges of AI. The questions of our time, as asked with clarity by Chinese President Xi Jinping, are:

How to get along with thinking machines?

How to ensure security when the algorithm is part of decision-making?

How to tackle ethical challenges through technologies through adaptive governance? and

How to realise AI for all when the divide keeps widening?

These questions cannot be answered by any single country. They deserve the attention of the whole global community.

China proposes that the world should take a people-centred approach in developing AI for the good of humanity, whereby AI is treated as a key enabler of shared prosperity and common security. Xi is keen to join hands with other leaders to build a just and equitable global AI governance system.

China has a few propositions to make this vision a reality, as eloquently articulated by the insightful Xi Jinping.

The first proposition is on adhering to the principle of openness and win-win cooperation to boost innovation-driven development. There is a recognition that AI is moving from just being a digital tool to having a real-world impact in physical application, making it a new engine of world economic growth and an accelerator for the shift of growth drivers. China proposes that we harness this rare, historic opportunity to encourage open source, openness, collaboration and sharing of AI power. It suggests the coordination of efforts in transforming and upgrading traditional industries, the cultivation and growth of emerging industries and forward-looking planning for future industries, so that all sectors and businesses can benefit from AI.

The second proposal is for the strengthening of risk awareness and ensuring that AI is secure and controllable. This involves a critical handling of the inherent and secondary risks of AI. Beijing proposes that we establish laws and regulations, technological monitoring, early warning and emergency response systems in order to strengthen the line of security, prevent abuses and malicious use, and ensure that AI is always under the oversight and direction of humans.

Thirdly, China is championing the principle of inclusiveness rather than inclusivity and the promotion of mutual learning between civilisations. This will uphold the diversity of world civilisations and the uniqueness of cultures around the world, and also inhibit the risk of AI eroding this diversity.

The final proposition China has unveiled is advocating for solidarity and improving global governance. It recognises AI as an invaluable asset that encapsulates humanity’s collective wisdom. It is encouraging for multilateralism and the recognition of the important role of the UN. It is calling for alignment and coordination in the strategies for developing AI. This will enable us to build a consensus-based global governance framework with rules and technical standards guiding AI development. President Xi has more particularly argued that the world “must carry out extensive international cooperation and help Global South countries with capacity building to bridge the AI and digital divides, promote sustainable development, and prevent creating new historical injustice in AI.”

The writer is a research fellow at the Development Watch Centre.

Could Electricity Vehicles be the long-term solution to the rising Fuel prices?

Global fuel prices have once again become a barometer of geopolitical tension post Covid-19 times. In April 2026, the fragile ceasefire negotiations between Iran and the United States of America triggered sharp swings in Brent crude with prices spiking to 12% in a single week after the talks stalled over uranium enrichment limits. Despite the shale output, USA felt the shock immediately yet it still imports about 6.3 million barrels per day. American gasoline now averages at $4.28 per gallon in the last quarter with a notable increase of 18%. The Energy Department largely attributes this to external conflicts translating into pump prices as a result of disruptions into the supply chains. The Strait of Hormuz avails nearly 22% of the global oil transits thus every ceasefire rumor or event becomes a tax on commuters from Texas. The question facing policymakers is nolonger whether oil is volatile but rather whether dependence on it is sustainable.

China over the past five years has offered a contrasting data point in response to this volatility. In 2021, President Xi stated that energy security must be rooted in self-reliance with new energy as the mainstay and this has since been matched with Capital Investments. Currently Beijing treats electrification as not only climate policy but also as an economic insulation. In 2025 alone, China installed 230 GW of solar and wind capacity more than the rest of the world combined. The State Grid Corporation now reports that EVs now account for 44% of all new car sales supported by 8.6 million public charging points nationwide to enhance service delivery. Nowonder, an average Chinese driver pays the equivalent of $1.10 per gallon when charging at home during off-peak hours compared to $4.60 for gasoline in Shanghai. The 14th five-year plan allocated $180 billion to grid upgrades and battery supply chains. This is part of a dual circulation strategy to link decoupling from imported oil that covers 70% of China’s crude needs to clean energy with a clearly stated goal that electricity becomes the default energy carrier for transport by 2035.

Uganda on the otherhand is sitting at the sharp end of this global equation. We being landlocked country, this shock hits us twofold; firstly at the port in Mombasa and then through domestic transport markups. In April 2026 following the Iran ceasefire turbulence, petrol across the 7 cities hit Ugx 6,300 per litre. This represents a 30% increase from July 2025. For a boda boda rider covering 80km daily, fuel now consumes over 50% of gross incomes unmatched to the competition of electric bikes that are starting to flood the cities.

Uganda’s overlooked advantage of electricity could be the life jacket in this titanic. With the commissioning of Karuma, installed capacity stretched to 2,048 MW against peak demand of 1,100 MW. Additionally, the regulator continues to report a surplus of nearly 40% during night hours when vehicle charging would mostly occur. Uedcl’s domestic tariff of Ugx 756 per kWh when converted, an electric bike covering 80km would use roughly 3.2 kWh costing Ugx 2,570 versus Ugx 6,300 for petrol at current efficiency. This is a 60% operating saving before maintenance differences are counted.

The policy parallel with China is not about scale but rather sequencing. President Xi’s model pairs generation, grid and demand. Uganda’s Energy transition plan targets 52, 000 MW of capacity and clean cooking but transport is the missing link. Kiira Motors and Zembo report electric bodas cut fuel by Ugx 18k daily and require one-tenth the maintenance of combustion engines. If 50k of Kampala’s estimated 120k bodas shifted, the city would offset 46 million litres of petrol annually translating to $38 million in forex savings at today’s prices. The global lesson from the Iran-USA standoff is that price sovereignty matters. China is buying it with solar panels and batteries. Uganda can buy it with hydro at night.

Challenges remain and must not be undertstated. Upfront costs for EVs are still 1.8x higher than petrol equivalents, charge infrastructure outside Kampala is sparse and Uedcl’s reliability in rural areas needs a robust investment. But the fuel price trajectory makes the math shift yearly. The ministry of Energy’s own modeling shows that at Ugx 6,300 per litre, total cost of ownership for an electric boda reaches parity within 15 months. If global oil crosses $110 per barrel again which is a real risk if Iran negotiations collapse, parity drops to 9 months

Electricity will not replace oil overnight, and Uganda will still need petroleum for heavy transport, aviation, and industry for decades. Yet the strategic case is clear: every kilowatt-hour generated at Karuma is a barrel Uganda does not have to import through a chokepoint it cannot control. From Washington to Beijing to Kampala, the 2026 fuel shock is teaching the same lesson. Countries that generate their own energy for transport gain price stability that diplomacy cannot guarantee. For Uganda, with surplus hydro, a young EV fleet, and fuel prices now directly tied to Middle East ceasefire talks, electricity is not just cleaner. It is becoming the cheaper, more sovereign option. The Long-term solution to pump price pain may well come through a socket, not a pipeline.

 

The writer, Arthur Atuha is a research fellow at the Development Watch Centre.